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SYMPOSIUM ON SOVEREIGNTY, CYBERSPACE, AND TALLINN MANUAL 2.0
SOVEREIGNTY IN CYBERSPACE: LEX LATAVEL NON?
Michael N. Schmitt*, and Liis Vihul†
Globalization has not conquered sovereignty. Instead, the notion of sovereignty occupies center stage in dis-
cussions concerning the normative architecture of cyberspace. On the diplomatic level, the term is generally
employed in its broadest sense, one that signifies freedom from external control and influence. For instance,
when Western states raise the issue of human rights in cyberspace, those on the opposite side of the negotiating
table fall back on sovereignty-based arguments. Mention of sovereignty in consensus documents is consequently
often the price that liberal democracies pay to advance their policy priorities, such as individual freedoms and the
availability of self-help measures in response to hostile cyber operations.
Unfettered by the constraints of political agendas and negotiating tactics, the international legal academy has
tended to approach sovereignty from a normatively analytical perspective. For legal scholars, the question of how
the principle of sovereignty, as well as its derivative rules, govern cyber activities by and against states has become a
dominant topic on the research agenda. This essay assesses a recent controversy over whether sovereignty is a
primary rule of international law, sets forth the authors’ views on sovereignty violations in cyberspace, and high-
lights several resultant policy issues.
The Sovereignty Violation Controversy
Perhaps the most operationally relevant, and hence politically delicate, legal issue with respect to the cyber envi-
ronment is the identification of criteria for determining when cyber operations directed against a state violate its
sovereignty. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations examines the matter in the
commentary accompanying Rule 4, “Violation of Sovereignty”: “A State must not conduct cyber operations that
violate the sovereignty of another State.”1 Viewed in the larger context of the international law that regulates states’
cyber activities, the rule represents the most significant red line between lawful and internationally wrongful con-
duct. This place of prominence results from the fact that the other key2 rules—the prohibitions on intervention
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1 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAWAPPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS 17–27 (Michael N. Schmitt gen. ed., 2017) [here-
inafter Tallinn Manual 2.0].
2 Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of
International Security, 2013 Report, para. 19, UN Doc. A/68/98* (June 24, 2013) [hereinafter UN GGE 2013 Report]; Group of
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and the use of force—contain thresholds that are seldom reached. Thus, the vast majority of hostile cyber oper-
ations attributable to states implicate only the prohibition of violation of sovereignty.
Yet, some states have hesitated to confirm the principle of sovereignty as one that prohibits certain types of
cyber operations. This reluctance is tangible within the UN Group of Governmental Experts, the main state-
level forum in which international law and cyber-related discussions take place.3 Hesitant states appear to see
the greater latitude to pursue national security objectives in cyberspace that derives from the absence of a primary
rule of sovereignty as outweighing the likely costs of hostile cyber operations that might violate their sovereignty.
Against this background, it is understandable that the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) appears troubled by
the Tallinn Manual 2.0’s position on sovereignty. As the most cyber-capable nation in the world, the United States
executes many of its cyber operations through the DoD. Greater clarity with respect to sovereignty in cyberspace
might require the DoD either to exercise more restraint in its cyber operations or risk accusations of having vio-
lated international law if its operations came to light.
In this AJIL Unbound Symposium, Colonel Gary Corn and Robert Taylor, a current and former DoD senior
attorney, respectively, suggest that the premise that sovereignty bars certain cyber activities even when they fall
below the threshold of nonintervention is unfounded.4 It is notable that, presumably to preserve the DoD’s oper-
ational leeway, they have elected not to emphasize the substantial interpretive grey area that surrounds the pro-
hibition of sovereignty violations, which the Tallinn Manual 2.0 goes to great pains to highlight. They simply claim
that the principle of sovereignty does not function as a primary rule.5
We challenge Corn’s and Taylor’s position in a forthcoming Texas Law Review article.6 In our view, sovereignty
operates to safeguard territorial integrity and inviolability; disregard for another state’s territorial integrity and invi-
olability constitutes an internationally wrongful act. To support this assertion, we cite an array of examples of one
state’s conduct in another’s territory that states, international tribunals, or the Security Council have characterized
as violations of sovereignty, rather than intervention or a use of force. These include aerial trespass, unconsented-
to activities in the territorial sea and on land, causation of radioactive pollution in national airspace, and the exercise
of enforcement jurisdiction abroad.
Corn and Taylor appear to suggest that international law includes distinct prohibitions for each of these activ-
ities, but lacks analogous prohibitions for cyber operations. By our approach, the prevailing one in international
law, sovereignty serves as the legal basis upon which the unlawfulness of these various forms of conduct rests.
Although, as Corn and Taylor submit, the principle of sovereignty is the foundation for sovereignty-related
rules such as nonintervention, this does not preclude the existence of a prohibition of the violation of sovereignty
as such. To suggest otherwise would deprive the principle of most of its normative valence.
In fact, their objection to the legally binding nature of the principle of sovereignty is internally inconsistent. On
the one hand, they assert that the principle does not bar cyber operations against other states, whereas on the other,
they opine that it “should factor into the conduct of any cyber operation”7 and that states engaging in cyber activ-
ities “must consider the sovereignty of the states in whose territory these [cyber] infrastructures reside.”8 The
question of whether the principle of sovereignty protects, as a matter of international law, a state from certain
cyber activities of other states is a binary one—it either does or does not. If the principle requires states to consider
3 See the cautious approach taken in UN GGE 2013 Report, supra note 2, at paras. 20, 27.
4 Gary P. Corn & Robert Taylor, Sovereignty in the Age of Cyber, 111 AJIL UNBOUND 207, 208–209 (2017).
5 Id. at 209.
6 Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Respect for Sovereignty in Cyberspace, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1639 (2017).
7 Corn & Taylor, supra note 4, at 210.
8 Id. at 210.
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the sovereignty of other states when conducting cyber operations, as Corn and Taylor (correctly) suggest, the mat-
ter is necessarily resolved in the affirmative.
Those who dispute sovereignty’s status as a primary rule would do well to recall that the ICJ has addressed
violations of sovereignty on multiple occasions. Although acknowledging a few of these judgments, Corn and
Taylor opine that since some of the activities concerned also amounted to uses of force and intervention, they
constituted violations of sovereignty and territorial integrity “in the broader sense.”9 This begs the question of
why the Court would explicitly refer to a violation of sovereignty, as distinct from the other two prohibitions,
when the function of the Court is to assess whether the conduct before it amounted to specific internationally
wrongful acts.10 Corn and Taylor also seem to turn a blind eye to the fact that in Corfu Channel and Certain
Activities, two of the three judgments they cite, the Court concluded, respectively, that the minesweeping operation
in Albania’s territorial sea11 and excavation of the channels and establishment of a military presence on Costa
Rican territory12 only constituted violations of sovereignty, not unlawful interventions or uses of force. If it suf-
ficed for the Court to render judgment in those cases on the grounds of sovereignty violations, no conclusion can
be drawn other than that the principle of sovereignty operates as a primary rule of international law.13
The Threshold for Sovereignty Violations in Cyberspace
The question is which cyber operations, especially those mounted from outside the target state’s territory, fall
within the protective scope of the principle. In Tallinn Manual 2.0, we, together with the seventeen other members
of the so-called “International Group of Experts,” found that violations of sovereignty could be based on two
different grounds: “(1) the degree of infringement upon the target state’s territorial integrity; and (2) whether
there has been an interference with or usurpation of inherently governmental functions.”14
The former is premised on the integrity and inviolability of sovereign territory. The dilemma lay in determining
which cyber operations infringe these rights. Complicating our assessment were the myriad ways in which cyber
operations manifest themselves in a target state—they can entail anything from the simple scanning of ports to
causing physical effects akin to those of kinetic military operations. A plethora of consequences fall between these
extremes, such as the extraction of information that possesses intelligence value, disrupting e-commerce activities,
or wiping data from systems on which critical services are run.
Because violations of sovereignty in the non-cyber context typically have entailed physical acts in other states’
territory, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 group reasoned by analogy that remote cyber operations producing physical con-
sequences likewise qualify. This conclusion is in line with the object and purpose of the principle of sovereignty.15
We also agreed that a violation of sovereignty occurs when the restoration of functionality following a hostile
cyber operation requires physical repair, such as the replacement of hard drives. Whether a server park, for
instance, is physically destroyed or its systems are permanently compromised by remote means, the ensuing effects
9 Id. at 210 n. 14.
10 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 33 UNTS 993.
11 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Merits, 1949 ICJ REP. 4, 35 (Apr. 9).
12 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along
the San Juan River (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), para. 229 (Dec. 16, 2015).
13 Indeed, in the case between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, the Court decided not to assess the use of force issue, noting, the “relevant
conduct of Nicaragua has already been addressed in the context of the Court’s examination of the violation of Costa Rica’s territorial sov-
ereignty.” Id. at paras. 96–97.
14 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 1, rule 4, cmt. para. 10.
15 Id., rule 4, cmt. para. 11.
2017 SOVEREIGNTY IN CYBERSPACE 215
are the same—the server park no longer fulfils its intended role. As to less severe effects on functionality, the
experts’ views varied.16
Whereas state practice and jurisprudence regarding sovereignty violations, including that discussed in our other
work,17 tends to be premised on territorial integrity and inviolability, the International Group of Experts further
concluded that it was apposite to view the exercise of a state’s inherently governmental functions as protected by
sovereignty.18 The Tallinn Manual 2.0 cites the Island of Palmas arbitral award, which sets forth the authoritative
articulation of the crux of sovereignty. There, the distinguished arbiter Max Huber observed, “[s]overeignty in
the relations between states signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the
right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State.”19 It was the group’s unan-
imous view that a state violates the sovereignty of another state when it, by means of cyber operations, interferes
with or usurps functions that lie at the heart of the other’s independence. If sovereignty grants states the exclusive
right to exercise state functions, other states necessarily shoulder a corresponding duty to respect that right.
Indeed, cyber operations that breach territorial integrity and inviolability may pose less of a national security
threat than those that impede the exercise of inherently governmental functions. For instance, the damage
done to Sony Pictures Entertainment’s computer systems in 2014 by cyber operations,20 provided they were attrib-
utable to a state, amounted to a violation of U.S. sovereignty due to the infringement on territorial integrity and
inviolability. However, such an operation represents less of a national security concern than one that, for instance,
“interferes with the delivery of social services, the conduct of elections, the collection of taxes, the effective con-
duct of diplomacy, [or] the performance of key national defence activities.”21
Policy Considerations
Corn and Taylor opine that the troubling aspect of the assertion that cyber operations can violate the principle of
sovereignty is that the rule would supposedly deprive states of the ability to undertake cyber operations required to
disrupt terrorist cyber infrastructure and engage in essential cyber espionage.22 With regard to countering the
online activities of terrorist groups such as ISIS, the two observe that it is sometimes operationally necessary
to direct cyber operations against infrastructure that is used by the groups, but is located beyond the area in
which hostilities are being conducted. They fear that in these situations the principle of sovereignty could preclude
the state from engaging in necessary operations. But whether this is the case depends on the specific nature of the
cyber operations in question, the target territory, and other attendant circumstances.
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 does not offer definitive guidance on whether cyber operations that target terrorist orga-
nizations’ social media accounts, online fora, recruiting and propaganda websites, or other online resources that
are hosted on infrastructure located abroad and beyond the geographic scope of armed conflict violate sovereignty
under the territorial integrity and inviolability test. Sensitive to the unsettled nature of international law on this
matter, the relevant text in the Tallinn Manual 2.0 is intentionally laconic. To the extent that the cyber operations
Corn and Taylor describe neither cause physical damage to, nor a loss of functionality of, the targeted cyber
16 Id. at paras. 13–14.
17 Schmitt & Vihul, supra note 6.
18 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 1, rule 4, cmt. paras. 10, 15–20.
19 Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
20 The cyber operation targeting Sony “resulted in the destruction of about three-quarters of the computers and servers at the studio’s
main operations.” David E. Sanger & Michael S. Schmidt, More Sanctions on North Korea After Sony Case, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2015).
21 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 1, rule 4, cmt. para. 16.
22 Corn & Taylor, supra note 4, at 211.
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infrastructure, the state conducting those operations may have a reasonable argument that such digital penetra-
tions of foreign territory are not in breach of territorial integrity and inviolability. TheManual purposefully leaves it
to states, through practice and opinio juris, to clarify the interpretation of a sovereignty violation in the cyber context.
International law considerations aside, it is doubtful that a state knowing of such operations directed at its ter-
ritory would tolerate them from a policy perspective. Of course, to the extent a territorial state remains unaware of
cyber operations, the state conducting them risks no legal or political consequences. The latter must, however, be
cognizant of the reality that if detected, adverse political reactions could ensue (which would be the case irrespec-
tive of the permissibility of the operations under international law).
Political blowback is an especially acute risk for the United States. Still reeling from the reputational damage
caused by the Wikileaks and Snowden revelations, disclosure of further covert operations would likely trigger
stronger reactions than the discovery of comparable cyber operations conducted by many other states. U.S. oper-
ations might well be characterized in the political or legal sense as an abuse of its technological supremacy by acting
in disregard of other states’ sovereignty. This could lead to further “Westphalianization” of the internet, as well as
increased data localization, which runs counter to the long-term U.S. policy objective of the free flow of
information.
An additional worrisome element in Corn and Taylor’s reasoning is their singling out of terrorists’ online activ-
ities as justifying a legal green light for cyber operations abroad. While fighting terrorist groups like ISIS is a laud-
able policy objective from both a domestic and international security perspective, the principle of sovereign
equality means that such a justification will be equally available to all other states. Thus, the proposition that
cyber operations on foreign soil are permissible if undertaken to counter terrorist activities, which is what
Corn and Taylor seem to imply,23 could open the door to other states’ cyber operations against U.S. cyber infra-
structure, for understandings of what the term “terrorism” denotes differ dramatically. For example, China’s 2015
counterterrorism legislation provides an open-ended definition of terrorism that could extend to nonviolent dis-
sident activities and certain exercises of speech.24 If the United States justifies unilateral actions in foreign cyber
infrastructure on the basis of counterterrorism, it is reasonable to assume that other states will feel entitled to do
the same, and may use expansive definitions in doing so. Corn’s and Taylor’s caveat that they are referring to ter-
rorists or terrorist organizations that are “widely recognized as such”25 begs the question of the legal basis for this
qualifier, while offering little solace from a practical perspective.
Corn and Taylor also appear to be uneasy with treating a state’s territory as inviolable out of concern that it
would render espionage activities that are physically conducted on foreign territory as a violation of sovereignty.
But, as discussed above and contrary to their assertion, territorial integrity and inviolability are firmly grounded in
international law; the primary rule prohibiting the violation of sovereignty accordingly has long been lex lata. For
espionage conducted on another state’s territory to be lawful, it would have to constitute a customary exception to
the general principle of territorial integrity and inviolability. While extensive state practice offers support for this
proposition, the lack of opinio juris cuts the other way. As Quincy Wright opined in 1962, the “frequent practice has
not established a rule of law because the practice is accompanied not by a sense of right but by a sense of wrong.”26
Indeed, if contrary state practice alone sufficed in the abstract to undercut a customary norm, both the prohibi-
tions on intervention and the use of force would be at risk.
23 Id. at 210, 212.
24 Zunyou Zhou, China’s Comprehensive Counter-Terrorism Law, THE DIPLOMAT (Jan. 23, 2016).
25 Corn & Taylor, supra note 4, at 211.
26 Quincy Wright, Espionage and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in International Affairs, in ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3,
17 (Roland J. Stanger ed., 1962).
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Of course, we are sensitive to the fact that states generally act pragmatically in their international relations. Most
have an interest in engaging in espionage, although conversely they do not tolerate espionage on their own territory,
as evidenced by its universal criminalization in domestic law. The situation is inherently paradoxical—states pro-
scribe the very conduct in which their own agents engage. It is accordingly rational that international law does not
prohibit espionage per se, since it is so prevalent, but rather only certain methods by which it is conducted.27
Remote cyber espionage represents a less severe incursion into another state’s sovereign territory and therefore
is less likely to be characterized as a violation of territorial integrity and inviolability. The question is not whether
remote cyber operations violate sovereignty; they do not as such. Rather, the correct query is whether the method
employed to conduct the espionage, and the resulting effects, render the operation unlawful, as in the case of caus-
ing physical damage to cover one’s cyber tracks. This approach affords sufficient international law leeway for states
to engage in much of the espionage that Corn and Taylor deem necessary to safeguard national security.
Conclusion
On its face, the principle of sovereignty appears to be incompatible with cyberspace. Whereas sovereignty is an
inherently territorial concept, cyberspace connects states in ways that seem to dilute territoriality. Nevertheless, the
two phenomena have continued to exist in parallel since the emergence of cyber capabilities.
Considering their uneasy coexistence, states and the broader international community have sought to delicately
balance the notions of a free flow of information in cyberspace with a state’s sovereign control over cyber activities
occurring within its territory. Of concern is the fact that an increasing number of states are resorting to rhetoric and
practice that seems to strongly favor sovereignty over a free and open cyberspace.28 For liberal democracies, it is
imperative to counter this trend.
What Corn and Taylor suggest, however, takes the principled Western opposition to sovereignty too far. The
legally binding nature of the principle of sovereignty cannot be wished away for operational reasons. They have
exaggerated the risks posed by the rule prohibiting violations of sovereignty. Rather than decry the existence of
such a rule, the United States and other states would be better served by working together to carefully map its
parameters. Doing so would enhance the protection that the law affords U.S. cyber infrastructure and activities.
Lastly, we must be realistic. States, whether they are allies of the United States or not, whether they know of the
purported U.S. counterterrorist operations occurring on cyber infrastructure located on their territory or not, and
whether they are cyber capable or not, are unlikely to tolerate foreign cyber operations on their territory. GivenU.S.
technological supremacy and the fact that territorial states are often oblivious to effects manifesting on their cyber
infrastructure, it may seem sensible to refuse to acknowledge the normative firewall that sovereignty represents.
But in the long term, this approach is bound to backfire, with political damage potentially outweighing what can be
gained from such cyber operations. Advocates of the approach will inevitably learn that sovereignty-violating cyber
operations can only be pursued as a measure of last resort and with full knowledge of the likely reactions.
27 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 1, rule 32.
28 See, e.g., China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Strategy of Cooperation on Cyberspace (Mar. 1, 2017) (English translation).
The strategy lists sovereignty as one of the four basic principles of international cooperation in cyberspace.
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